Introduction
The European Union is the patron saint of interregionalism in international economic relations. It has pursued interregional strategies in one form or another toward regional groupings in South America, East Asia, the Southern Mediterranean, Eastern Europe, and a variety of least-developed countries. However, the case of EU relations with North America (the United States, Canada, and Mexico) shows the limits of this doctrine. During the 1990s, the foundations for a transatlantic interregional relationship emerged. The EU institutionalized cooperative economic relations with the United States and Canada within separate but similar bilateral frameworks, and completed a free trade agreement (FTA) with Mexico. During the same period, the creation of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) established a free trade zone among the more than 400 million inhabitants of North America. These developments potentially opened the door to the grandest of interregional agreements between the world's two largest regional blocs.
Yet even as the EU pursued interregional strategies toward many other illdefined and weakly institutionalized 'regions,' it avoided an interregional approach toward its most important commercial partner. Simply put, there is no discernable EU-North America relationship. But this state of affairs is precisely what makes this negative case important to explore; it is just as essential to account for why interregionalism does not occur as it is to understand why it does.
In this article, we view the past practice and future prospects of EU interregionalism toward North America in their commercial relations through an analytical lens we have developed elsewhere (Aggarwal and Fogarty 2004) . Notably, we do not address interregionalism as a process or outcome, as Söderbaum and van Langenhove do in the introduction to this special issue-though we certainly acknowledge the utility of doing so.
1 Rather, we analyze interregionalism as a policy strategy-the choice to pursue (or not to pursue, in the EU-North America case)
formalized intergovernmental relations across distinct regions. Hence we focus on the question of why European Union policymakers chose to pursue a policy to deal with each of the three countries of North America bilaterally, without seriously considering an interregional relationship with NAFTA.
As with any study of foreign economic policy, a variety of factors may be relevant in explaining the absence of EU interregionalism in this case. Accordingly, we consider three "lenses" through which to view EU commercial policy toward
North America: interest group preferences and behaviour, security competition, and transnational identity formation. These lenses are neither exhaustive nor mutually exclusive, but are useful tools for separating out what we believe to be the key dynamics relevant to this case. Notably, these lenses involve political, rather than economic, factors. Although there may be a market logic to these strategies, we start from the assumption that political factors drive policymakers' choice of interregionalism as opposed to multilateralism, bilateralism, and other trade strategies.
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In section three of this article, we briefly introduce each analytical lens in general terms, and then apply that lens to EU commercial policy toward North
America. But first we briefly sketch EU commercial relations with each of the countries of North America and NAFTA collectively over the past fifteen years to provide some empirical background for the ensuing analysis of EU commercial policy and the absence of interregionalism. 1 In our earlier work, we analyzed interregionalism both as a policy strategy and a type of relationship.
II. Describing EU commercial relations with North America 3
Despite the creation of NAFTA in 1994, the EU has studiously maintained separate bilateral tracks for managing its commercial relations with the three countries of North America. Thus to assess the EU's trade ties to NAFTA as a whole, we first briefly consider those with each North American country individually.
Europe and the United States
The Europe-United States commercial relationship remains the cornerstone of the international economy. integration-which would be as much a political as an economic process-that much more distant.
The European Union and Canada
The recent trajectory of EU-Canada commercial relations has broadly followed that of EU-U.S. relations. This fact comes as little surprise: given the broad political and economic similarities (in nature, if not size) between North America's two more economically advanced countries, the EU effectively put institutional developments in these two relationships on parallel tracks. Canada-always eager to step out of the shadow of its overweening neighbor to the south, and dependent on the EU as its second largest trading partner-has not always championed this parallelism, but has yet to prevail on the EU to take seriously any new approach to EU-Canadian relations. 
The European Union and NAFTA
Describing the relationship between the EU and NAFTA is not a straightforward task, for the simple reason that it does not officially exist. However, it is possible to consider some aspects of NAFTA relevant to a prospective interregional relationship.
The main hindrance to EU-North American commerce-and the issue addressed in agreements like the MRAs-is nontariff barriers such as subsidies and product standards. The primacy that technical issues such as NTBs now take in EUNorth American trade relations underscores how deeply integrated the two side's economies already are. The EU accounts for 35 percent of "NAFTA's" exports (excluding intra-North American trade) and 25 percent of its imports, and thus is NAFTA's most important trading partner. Together, the EU and NAFTA account for customs union in the absence of a major shift in the international political and economic climate-and, more importantly, the U.S. domestic political climate. countries. This potentially transitional character of NAFTA means that it is unlikely to take on any greater integrationist elements among current and/or future members;
negotiations among all the countries of the hemisphere toward anything but a straight free trade area-as opposed to, say, a customs union-would be far too difficult to manage within the proposed time frame (negotiations for an FTAA are supposed to be completed in 2005). In short, while the unresolved shape of NAFTA is in itself not a barrier to an interregional arrangement with the EU-after all, the EU itself is constantly evolving in both membership and structure-North and South American as well as European policymakers' perceptions of its temporary character are. Only if the FTAA were to founder would NAFTA be likely to take on a more permanent status and potentially make separate interregional agreements on its own.
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Compared to its relations with other regional groupings around the world, the EU has shown little inclination to engage NAFTA collectively as a means to promote a regionalist model of economic organization. 9 But even if the EU did want to promote greater internal coherence in NAFTA, significant obstacles stand in the way.
As Alberta Sbragia has indicated, the EU and NAFTA are not "institutionally compatible entities"-the EU being an economic/monetary union, NAFTA a mere trade/investment union-and thus NAFTA does not have any executive with the external negotiating authority similar to the Commission (Sbragia 2001) . While in some cases of interregional relations the EU literally created its counterpart region, NAFTA already exists and will evolve only to the extent that Washington allows;
NAFTA represents "first-generation regionalism"-a hegemon-inspired agreement whose dominant focus is economic (trade and investment). 8 One open question here is, of course, whether NAFTA would itself "disappear" as a separate entity within an FTAA, or whether it would continue to exist as a nested arrangement under the FTAA. This question will likely remain open until FTAA negotiations progress further. 9 The EU's overt promotion of "counterpart coherence" in its policies toward Mercosur, the Southern Mediterranean, and East Asia suggests its policymakers have this sort of regionalist diffusion very much in mind. On the concept of counterpart coherence, see Aggarwal and Fogarty 2004, 17-19. there would be no diffusion of institutional forms from the EU to NAFTA in the way that there might be among regions that aspire to EU-like structures. Even if interregional negotiations were to begin, a transatlantic free trade area would be a discussion between Brussels and Washington. As one British parliamentarian has remarked, "When politicians in Europe talk about 'transatlantic,' they really mean the United States of America. This is an extremely important point that Canadians and Mexicans need to appreciate" (Council of Europe 2000, 17-18) . While this situation of institutional incompatibility does not rule out progress in EU-NAFTA relations, it does imply that convergence between the two would remain limited.
III. Explaining the absence of EU interregional strategies toward North America
But NAFTA's limitations do not explain EU strategy; EU-centered factors do. Hence we consider three hypotheses as potential explanations for the absence of an EU interregional strategy toward North America: interest group preferences, great power politics, and EU identity-building processes. We use these standard hypotheses of foreign economic policy preference and strategy formation as lenses through which to view different influences on EU policy in relative isolation from one another; none is a full and accurate description of events in and of itself. Rather, individually and collectively these lenses demonstrate that the absence of an EU interregional strategy toward North America is entirely unsurprising, because few of the conditions necessary for adoption of such a strategy are present.
Interest groups
Our first lens focuses on the role of interest groups. In this "pluralist" view, European 14 The New York Times identified U.S.-EU disagreements on this issue as based in fundamental philosophical differences regarding the "precautionary principle"-i.e., whether GMOs must be scientifically proven "innocent" before they may be imported or proven "guilty" before their import could be banned. The United States takes the latter position, the EU the former. The New York Times, 25 May 2003.
Given the relative parity among European free-trade groups and their more skeptical counterparts, and the relative acceptability (and intractability) of the status quo for all involved, there has not been, and seems to be little prospect of, an interest group-led groundswell for a an interregional strategy toward North America. On balance, an interregional agreement might be a moderate improvement on the status quo, but the limited gains of such an agreement compare unfavorably with the costs of a broad-based business mobilization for such an outcome-especially because individual industries seem more interested in sector-specific agreements than in broader ones in which their goals might get negotiated away. 15 In this environment, the preferences of the skeptics holds sway.
Great power politics
Our second lens focuses on the role of international power politics. From this "realist" perspective, the EU uses its foreign economic policy to promote European political and economic influence and security within the international system. Indeed, as long as Europe remains primarily a "civilian power," commercial policy is its most effective means of exercising international influence.
In this context, a general interregional commercial strategy could extend European influence via a series of "hegemon-centered" commercial agreements with regions that may or may not have significant ties amongst themselves. 16 In most region-to-region relationships, the European Union would be the dominant side, and thus could largely dictate the terms of these institutionalized relationships. However, this condition does not apply in the case of North America, which is home to the EU's main commercial rival, the United States. perception. Even during the darkest days of the cold war, when it actually seemed possible that the West might stand alone against a hostile world, no serious steps toward formal transatlantic economic integration were taken. Such steps seem even less likely in the post-9/11 world, despite the fact that the West as a whole is a target of global terrorist networks. While these scenarios are merely counterfactual speculations, they do suggest that there is little strategic reason for the creation of a transatlantic free trade area, whether under current conditions or in the foreseeable future.
Transatlantic identities, convergent or divergent
Our third lens focuses on the role of European identity-building in explaining the absence of interregionalism in EU commercial policy toward North America. In this view, European elites-particularly within the Commission but also in member countries-promote commercial strategies that might help generate notions of panEuropean interests and identity among the peoples of Europe. While hardly central to Europeans' everyday lives in the same way as, for example, the introduction of the euro, an interregional commercial strategy would be a subtle way for EU policymakers to prod them to view themselves as part of a cohesive economic, political, and social unit that interacts with other like-units around the world.
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The identity-related implications of interregionalism toward North America would be different from those of EU relations with other regions. The United States and Canada are uniquely similar societies to Europe, and thus this relationship involves association with a "peer" region rather than one that has a clearly distinct set 19 Manners 2001 has suggested that European leaders have sought to foster an overall European identity through comparison to other peer nations. More generally, Karl Deutsch and his colleagues have argued that commercial interactions can generate feelings of mutual identification. See Deutsch et al. 1957 and Deutsch 1966. of Perhaps less problematically, EU policymakers' transatlantic strategies also reflect their ongoing construction of the EU's "international identity"-and how that international identity stands in contrast to that of the United States. 25 As Robert
Kagan described the contrast between the two, the EU, born of cooperative multilateralism, seeks a "self-contained world of laws and rules based on transnational negotiation and cooperation," while the United States believes that "international laws and rules are unreliable" and "true security and the promotion of a liberal order still depend on the possession and use of military might" (Kagan 2003, 3) . The Europeans' legalistic approach to international relations seems to have emerged from the EU's own internal evolution, and can be seen, for example, in Europeans' approach to the international criminal court (pooling sovereignty) and its preference for hard targets in the Kyoto protocol (analogous to the specific economic criteria of EMU). This approach finds a strong contrast in the longstanding American preference for flexibility and freedom of maneuver in international politics, a preference that is particularly strong in the current U.S. administration. Moreover, if this American preference for freedom of action pushes it to pursue perpetual hegemony, a likely European reaction would be "Euro-Gaullism"-the pursuit of European unity for the sake of autonomy from the United States (Kühnhardt 2003, 12 A realist analysis of international relations would lead us to expect an increasingly coherent EU to maintain the preferences of the strong-i.e., like the United States, for freedom of maneuver to pursue one's interests and security.
However, closer attention to how the EU externalizes an approach to governance developed through its internal experience of building unity may be a better guide to understanding how EU and U.S. perceptions of their interests and identities may continue to diverge. And if divergence is the order of the day, then the EU's disinclination to pursue an interregional commercial strategy toward a U.S.-dominated North America is hardly surprising.
IV. Conclusion
The commercial ties the European Union has developed with the countries of North America are strong, and will remain so for the foreseeable future. While these relationships have developed separately, today they form a fairly coherent whole: EU Europe's commercial position in the world. In this context, access to potentially lucrative markets is relative, and, as its rationale for pursuing an FTA with Mexico (among others) suggests, the EU is very much concerned with its position relative to the United States. International trade and investment are the primary means through which economic power, influence, and prosperity are redistributed across nations, and by which "national" champions are created. Moreover, given the EU's difficulties in operationalizing a common foreign and security policy-and the increasing gap between EU and U.S. military capabilities-external commercial policy is the realistic locus of Europe's pursuit of relative material gain. Through this lens, a particularly clear picture of the limited prospects of an interregional strategy can be discerned.
While it is difficult to draw direct lines from questions of identities and culture to those of economic relationships, given the cultural content of trade and lingering questions about the coherence of the West, it is also useful to view EU commercial policy through the lens of identity considerations. Surely a shared sense of identity is not a sufficient condition for pursuing an interregional commercial relationship, nor is its absence sufficient to destroy interregionalism's prospects. Yet the EU's struggle to define its internal and external identities, and the omnipresence of an American superpower that insists on going its own way in international affairs, clearly provide a powerful incentive for the EU to define itself in contrast to the bullying hegemonand a disincentive to tie itself more closely to it. While such a proposition is difficult to substantiate, and may be contingent on the parties and individuals in power in Washington and European capitals at any given time, it cannot be ignored in the current transatlantic political climate.
So, what does the EU-North American case tell us about EU interregional strategies in general? The initial reaction is one of skepticism: if the EU lacks a compelling reason to pursue an interregional strategy toward a region in which Europe has vital interests and which already has its own regional institution, how viable could interregionalism really be as a more general strategy? However, unlike other cases of EU interregionalism, this is the one in which the status quo terms of political and economic relations are acceptable from most relevant perspectives. A major impetus for transatlantic interregionalism would come only from a transformative event that created a new political rationale for such a strategy. Absent such an event, there seems little impetus for an interregional strategy-whether from interest groups, power politics, or cultural/identity considerations. And given that 11
September 2001 was not sufficiently transformative to create this new political rationale, it is probably best to hope that no truly transformative event does occur.
Thus the absence of an EU interregional strategy toward North America does not necessarily undermine the conceptual or policy significance of interregionalism more generally. What it does suggest is that EU interregionalism is, at least at this point, primarily a strategy aimed at achieving gains the EU has been unable to reap through more traditional multilateral and bilateral channels. And while there may not be a single, unified logic for pursuing an interregionalism, and while bilateral or multilateral approaches may serve specific goals more efficiently, interregionalism has generally proven productive-or at least not counterproductive-for most all actors with an interest in EU foreign economic policy. The absence of an EU interregional strategy toward North America, in which the net gains from interregionalism would be far smaller than toward other regions, does not undermine this basic calculus. And if the Doha Round of WTO negotiations were to falter, the appeal of an interregional strategy toward all regions, perhaps including North America, would grow.
